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The Tenth Justice Lost in
Indian Country
By Matthew L.M. Fletcher
Photo: Petroglyphs, Delgadita Canyon, New Mexico. By Lawrence R. Baca.
We'd end up in Indian country. Out where nobody
could even believe we were there. Places where you could
get shot just for wearing corduroy.
- Tom Waits'
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) occupies a
special place in the jurisprudence and practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court. The solicitor general, sometimes referred
to as the "tenth justice,"2 is the person that has the most
influence with the Supreme Court but is not a sitting jus-
tice. The OSG's lawyers are among the best appellate liti-
gators in the nation. Persuading the OSG to file an amicus
brief favoring one's position may be the make-or-break
moment in a case before the Supreme Court. 3 Because the
OSG represents the interests of the United States in every
Supreme Court case involving the federal government,4 the
office must file more than 100 briefs each term, making it
by far the most repeat player in Supreme Court litigation.
5
As a result, the outcomes of cases in which the OSG
participates heavily favor the United States-beginning
with the filing of a petition for certiorari to the final deci-
sion issued by the Court-as well as the parties aligned
with the United States. The Court grants significant defer-
ence to the OSG on a wide variety of levels-both sub-
stantively and procedurally. Whereas the Court grants only
about 3-5 percent of the petitions for certiorari filed in any
given term, 6 it grants 70 percent of these petitions filed by
the OSG. 7 And getting a case heard by the Court is more
than half the battle, as the Court routinely grants cases with
an eye toward reversing a lower court's ruling.
The kinds of cases involving the United States before
the Supreme Court tend to favor the federal government.
The OSG represents federal agencies that often are entitled
to Chevron deference. The OSG represents the United
States in federal criminal cases and defends federal statutes
from constitutional challenges. In all these areas, the Court
defers to the federal government.
None of this is new. Many other scholars have studied
the OSG's success before the Supreme Court, but no one
has studied the OSG's success when it serves in the unusu-
al role as trustee for Indian tribes. The plain outcomes
speak for themselves: the Supreme Court grants the Office
of the Solicitor General almost no deference whatsoever
when the OSG serves as trustee for Indian tribes or even
when the government is simply on the same side as tribal
interests. This trend is consistent with empirical research
on the so-called continuum of deference, whereby federal
courts appear to defer to certain federal agencies in nearly
every case, while other agencies like the U.S. Department
of Interior (which houses the Bureau of Indian Affairs)
receives no deference at all, despite Chevron.8
This article presents results of a preliminary study of the
OSG's performance at the Supreme Court from the 1998
through the 2009 terms. The discussion looks at the OSG's
success rates before the Court at every stage of litigation
beginning with the certiorari process and the Court's calls
for the views of the solicitor general, as well as on the
merits of the cases that reach final decision after oral argu-
ment.
The article begins with a review of the preliminary data
on the OSG's success rate in Indian law cases. The data
demonstrate that the OSG retains its success rate in both
the certiorari process and on the merits when the United
States is opposed to tribal interests. But when the OSG sits
as a party alongside tribal interests-and especially when
the OSG acts as an amicus siding with tribal interests-the
OSG's success rate drops dramatically.
The second part of this article provides commentary
on many of the Indian law petitions for certiorari and
cases decided on the merits as well as the OSG's role in
these instances. In Indian law cases not directly involv-
ing the interpretation of a federal statute (cases referred
to as "common law" cases), the OSG often has to choose
between two possible positions-whether to side with trib-
al interests or not to side with them. Usually, the OSG does
side with tribal interests in common law cases. In Indian
law cases directly involving the interpretation of a federal
statute, the OSG's primary role is to defend the statute and
the interpretation afforded the statute by federal agencies.
In these cases, the OSG is on much stronger ground and
often opposes tribal interests.
The purpose of this study is to help determine rea-
sons for the very low success rate before the Supreme
Court achieved by tribal interests in the past two or three
decades. Taken in the greater context of other studies
conducted on this phenomenon, the evidence that the
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Supreme Court has a significant and irrational animus
against tribal interests is growing.
The Data
As shown in Figure 1, from the Court's 1998 term
through its 2009 term, tribal interests prevailed in Supreme
Court decisions on the merits six times and failed 19
times-a 27 percent success rate.
Supreme Court Outcomes for Tribal
Interests - 1998 to 2009 Terms
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Figure 1
During the period studied, the United States sided
against tribal interests six times in cases. decided by the
Supreme Court as either a party or as amicus, winning
four times (67 percent). But the federal government also
sided with tribal interests 13 times, prevailing a mere
three times (23 percent). (See Figure 2.) In large part, the
federal government's success rate during these 12 Court
terms generally tracked the success rate of tribal interests.
If the government opposed tribal interests, the government
tended to succeed at its usual rate; but when the govern-
ment sided with tribal interests, the government shared a
very low success rate with tribal interests.
US as Tribal Trustee
*Success on Merits
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Figure 2
In the certiorari process, as a general rule, the OSG is
successful in defending against petitions for certiorari filed
against the United States or federal agencies, in contrast to
tribal interests on both fronts.' Rarely does a party succeed
in convincing the Court to grant certiorari over the OSG's
objections (only twice in 39 petitions during this period).
Petitioners usually are successful only when the OSG
acquiesces to a petition for certiorari. But when the OSG
is defending such a petition brought against tribal interests,
even if the United States is a party, the Supreme Court still
grants more than 20 percent of the petitions (5 grants and
19 denials). (See Figure 3.)
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Figure 3
As a rule of thumb, it is always better for Supreme Court
litigants to have the support of the United States and the
OSG, 10 but for tribal interests, that support offers negligible
advantages. To the extent that the Supreme Court defers
to the OSG, the deference drops to virtually nothing when
the OSG favors tribal interests. What's going on?
The Cases
Bare statistics tell only a portion of the story. It is useful
to examine several cases in which the federal government
participated. In general, the kinds of cases the Supreme
Court decides in Indian law can be divided into two cat-
egories: federal common law and statutory interpretation
cases. Criminal cases constitute a third category of cases
that sometimes incorporate Indian law questions but usu-
ally involve only individual Indians.
Federal Common Law Cases
As a general rule, the Supreme Court has greater flex-
ibility to decide federal common law questions. Indian
law and admiralty law are really the only two subject
areas in the U.S. Constitution that tend to involve ques-
tions of pure federal common law. In recent decades-
during the era of tribal self-determination-as Congress
has increasingly left Indian tribes to their own devices,
there have been fewer and fewer congressional acts that
control the disputes that arise in Indian country. In addi-
tion, because more of the Indian law cases are common
law cases, it appears from the outcomes reached by the
Court in the past few decades that tribal interests fare
exceptionally poorly in these cases. The sample studied
here is consistent with that data.
Land Claims
Perhaps the Office of the Solicitor General's most
astounding failure during the period under review came
in cases involving Indian land claims. During the period,
the Supreme Court decided the third in a line of cases
involving the land claims of the Oneida Indian Nation:
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544
U.S. 197 (2005). The United States was not a party to this
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case, but in the prior two cases, the United States and the
Oneida Indian Nation had been the plaintiffs in the land
claims brought against the state of New York and various
local governmental subdivisions. Oneida Indian Nation of
N.Y. v. Oneida County, N.Y., 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (Oneida
I); Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y.,
470 U.S. 226 (1985) (Oneida II).
The OSG and the tribe had been successful in two prior
trips to the Supreme Court, establishing a federal common
law cause of action to assert land claims in the first case
and winning on the merits of the land claims in the second
case. Importantly, even though the Court did not decide
the question because the state had waived it, a majority of
the Oneida II Court would have rejected equitable defens-
es to the land claims, including laches, acquiescence, and
impossibility. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 244-45 & n.16 ; id.
at 256 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Sherrill involved the reacquisition of the land in fee by
the Oneida Indian Nation within its reservation's bound-
aries. Under common law principles of federal Indian
law, the Treaty of Canadaigua, and the federal Trade and
Intercourse Act, the Oneida Nation asserted that it was not
required to pay property taxes to the local jurisdictions
for this land. The Second Circuit agreed with the Oneida
Nation on this theory, and the city of Sherrill sought cer-
tiorari to review the decision. The United States was not a
party to the lower court's proceedings, but the conference
requested the solicitor general's views. The OSG opined
that the petition should be denied, but the Court granted
certiorari anyway. The OSG participated as amicus and
split time during oral argument with the Oneida Nation's
counsel, but the Court ruled against the Oneida Nation
on the merits. Incredibly, the Court ignored the under-
lying legal theories altogether and, instead decided against
the Oneida Nation on grounds raised only by amici sup-
porting the petitioner-the equitable defenses of laches,
acquiescence, and impossibility." Even more incredibly,
the Court applied those defenses not to the Oneida Nation,
but to the United States itself. The Court's broad language
strongly implied that these equitable defenses would
henceforth apply to any Indian claim not directly tied to
Indian treaty rights.
Shortly after the Court issued the Sherrill decision, the
Second Circuit dismissed the entire bevy of land claims
asserted by the Cayuga Indian Nation of New York-a
tribe similarly situated as the Oneida Indian Nation was
and that had long relied on the same legal theories that
had been successful for the Oneidas. 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir.
2005). The United States, already a party to the Cayuga
Indian Nation's land claims, brought a petition for cer-
tiorari. The Court denied the petition without comment.
United States v. Pataki, 547 U.S. 1128 (2006) (No. 05-978);
Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 547 U.S. 1128
(2006) (No. 05-982).
The New York land claims cases are the most remark-
able instances in which the interests of the United States,
coinciding with tribal interests, failed spectacularly before
the Supreme Court. Usually, in cases involving tribal inter-
ests when the federal government sides with the tribes,
it is the tribal interests that have the most to lose. But in
the New York land claims cases, the United States lost on
the question of whether common law equitable defenses
could be used to defeat the property interests of the fed-
eral government. This was a very significant strategic loss
for the Office of the Solicitor General.
Taxation Cases
Even more so than land claims, cases involving taxation
of Indian tribes are rooted in federal common law. Long
ago, the Supreme Court adopted a rule that states and
local governments cannot tax tribal property or transac-
tions without an authorizing act of Congress. In re Kansas
Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866). However, Congress rarely has
expressed with any clarity when tribal property and trans-
actions become taxable by states and localities. So what
constitutes authorizing legislation is for the Court to decide
as a matter of federal common law.
During the period studied, the OSG filed briefs on the
merits in several Indian taxation cases. In two important
cases, the OSG sided with tribal interests and shared oral
argument time with tribal lawyers. And, in these cases,
the Supreme Court rejected the OSG's position. Only in
the cases in which the OSG opposed tribal interests did
the Court agree with the federal position. In short, the
Supreme Court agrees with the OSG in Indian taxation
cases only when the OSG opposes tribal interests.
In these cases, the federal government has less of a
stake than it has in the land claims cases. The United States
is usually not a party to taxation cases, nor is there a sig-
nificant federal interest at stake. Here, the OSG is acting
in the government's role as the trustee for Indian tribes.
However, in cases in which the government opposes
tribes, the impetus is the government's interest in the
proper interpretation of a federal statute.
The cases in which the OSG participated as amicus
favoring the tribal interests-Atkinson Trading Co. Inc. v.
Shirley and Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation-
both involved the tribal interests as the respondent. In
both cases, a state government opposed the tribes and the
Office of the Solicitor General. 532 U.S. 645 (2001); 546
U.S. 95 (2005). In Atkinson Trading, Texas participated as
an amicus and shared oral argument time, and in Wagnon,
Kansas was the petitioner. The participation of these states
surely offset whatever deference the Supreme Court would
offer the OSG.
In contrast, the Supreme Court followed the OSG's rea-
soning in Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Blaze Construction,
another case in which the OSG shared oral argument time.
526 U.S. 32 (1999). In that case, the OSG sided with the
state of Arizona in arguing that the respondent should be
subject to state taxation for extraction of natural resources
found on the reservation.
Finally in Chickasaw Nation v. United States, the OSG
successfully argued that the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act did not exempt tribal gaming operations from certain
federal taxes. 534 U.S. 84 (2001). In the statute in question,
Congress had offered a list of exempted activities that sup-
ported the Chickasaw Nation's position, but the Supreme
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Court interpreted the statute to exclude the plain language
on grounds that Congress had made a mistake.
Tribal Court Jurisdiction Cases
Despite the support of the OSG in several cases, tribal
interests have never persuaded the Supreme Court in any
specific case that nonmembers can be subject to the regu-
latory or adjudicatory authority of the tribe. Even more
than taxation cases, these cases are explicitly questions of
federal common law with nary an act of Congress appli-
cable. See generally National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Iowa Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Laplante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
One of the more devastating cases for tribal advocates
in the period under review was Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353 (2001). That case involved Floyd Hicks, a tribal citi-
zen, and a state game warden who twice went into Indian
country to execute search warrants for evidence that a
tribal citizen had captured an endangered species. In the
first instance, the state officer domesticated his state court-
issued search warrant with the tribal court and sought
assistance from tribal police, but in the second instance he
did not. The state officer found nothing both times, and
Floyd Hicks sued the officer in tribal court under federal
civil rights statutes for the damage done to his home.
Before the Supreme Court, the OSG shared oral argument
time with Hicks' advocate, but the Supreme Court roundly
rejected their claims, holding that the tribal court could
never have jurisdiction over a state officer, and that tribal
courts cannot have jurisdiction over any claims brought
under federal civil rights statutes.
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709
(2008). Once again, the OSG participated as amicus favor-
ing the tribal interests and shared oral argument time,
this time arguing that the federal government's practice
of guaranteeing loans to tribal businesses provided a suf-
ficient federal interest to favor tribal court jurisdiction over
a non-Indian-owned bank that had foreclosed on Indian
lands. And once again, the Supreme Court gave short
shrift to the OSG, although the 5-4 outcome (Justice Souter
joined the dissenters) was much closer.
Other Common Law Cases
During the period studied, the Supreme Court decided
one case involving the sovereign immunity of Indian
tribes: C & L Enterprises v. Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 532
U.S. 411 (2001). Even with the OSG sharing oral argument
time with the tribal nation, the Supreme Court held that
the tribe had implicitly waived its immunity from suit in
state court.
In addition, in Rice v. Cayetano, a case involving
Native Hawai'ian interests, the Supreme Court invoked the
Fifteenth Amendment to hold that non-Native Hawai'ians
can vote in elections and become trustees for the Office of
Hawai'ian Affairs, which administers the property rights of
Native Hawai'ians. 528 U.S. 495 (2000). The OSG shared
oral argument time with the Native Hawai'ian advocates,
but the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 against them. In 2009,
the Court again rejected the claims of Native Hawai'ians in
Hawai'i v. Office of Hawai'ian Affairs but at least remand-
ed the case to the Hawai'ian Supreme Court to rejconsider
under state law. 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009).
Statutory Interpretation Cases
In Indian law cases in which the main issue in question
is the interpretation of a federal statute, the United States
often vacates its position as trustee for tribal interests in
favor of its more important position of defending the con-
stitutionality or agency interpretation of the statute. But in
this different role before the Supreme Court, the OSG's
success rate continues to track the success rate of the tribal
interest at stake.
Consider Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian
Tribe, in which the United States shared oral argument
time with the tribal respondent but argued for a more
neutral interpretation of the statutes in question, the Coal
Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910. 526 U.S. 865 (1999). Even
in that case, the Court rejected much of the government's
position, with some justices openly laughing at the govern-
ment's advocate.
Another major blow to both the United States and its
tribal trustees was Dept. of Interior v. Klamath Water Users
Protective Ass'n., 532 U.S. 1 (2001), in which the govern-
ment and the Klamath Tribe in Oregon had shared docu-
ments prepared in anticipation of litigation over the Klamath
River's limited water resources. Opponents of the tribe
sought to obtain those documents through the Freedom
of Information Act, and the government rejected the claim
because they had been prepared for litigation purposes. The
Supreme Court broadly interpreted the act and narrowly
construed the trust relationship between the government
and tribes to reject the government's reasoning.
Perhaps the most disruptive recent case is Carcieri
v. Salazar, in which the Supreme Court held that the
Department of Interior cannot take land into trust for
Indian tribes that were not "under federal supervision" in
1934. 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009). In this case, the OSG argued
strenuously in favor of the Interior Department's 70-plus-
year interpretation of the Indian Reorganization Act, the
federal government's position as trustee for Indian tribes,
and the historical purposes of the act, only to be bluntly
rejected by the Supreme Court by a vote of 8-1. The deci-
sion may place the future land acquisitions of perhaps as
many as 100 tribes at risk.
Another major loss for the federal government, but
this time favoring tribal interests, was Cherokee Nation v.
Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005). In its decision in this case, the
Supreme Court held 8-0 that the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act required the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services to pay contract support
costs to tribal government Indian health contractors, even
if Congress had not been appropriated the money. In that
case, numerous non-Indian-related federal contractors
sided with the tribes as amici and argued that the federal
government had been denying them contract support costs
as well perhaps tipping the scales in favor of the tribal
contractors.
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When the United States sides against tribal interests in a
statutory interpretation case, the OSG's success rate returns
to normal. A case in point is Inyo County, Cal. v. Paiute-
Shoshone Indians, in which the OSG argued as amicus in
a case involving the county officials' forced entry onto the
tribal gaming complex to look for employment records.
538 U.S. 701 (2003). The OSG argued that the Bishop
Community was not eligible to sue under federal civil
rights statutes, a position with which the Court agreed, but
argued that tribal sovereign immunity shielded the tribe
from the imposition of the county officials, a position of
which the Court seemed extremely skeptical but remanded
for further consideration.
A complex type of statutory interpretation case that
involves significant common law principles is the so-called
trust case. These are cases usually brought by tribal inter-
ests against the federal government for failure to comply
with a federal statute or treaty benefiting tribal interests.
The Court decided three of these cases during the period
studied, ruling in favor of the United States in two of them,
with a major trust case-Cobell v. Salazar-hovering in the
lower courts. It is typical that the Supreme Court will only
hear these kinds of cases when the United States loses in
lower courts and petitions for review. The Court does not
hear tribal petitions and refused to hear two Cobell peti-
tions brought by tribal interests. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 549
U.S. 1317 (2007) (No. 06-867); Cobell v. Kempthorne, 549
U.S. 1317 (2007) (No. 06-868). The case has since been
settled.
In 2003, the Supreme Court decided two cases on the
same day: United States v. Navajo Nation and United States
v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 488 (2003);
537 U.S. 465 (2003). White Mountain involved the federal
government's failure to maintain government buildings
before turning them over to the tribe. The Court held that
the government breached its fiduciary duty to the tribe
because a federal statute had guaranteed the properties
to the tribe after the United States ceased to use them,
affirming a judgment of several million dollars made by a
lower court.
In Navajo Nation, the secretary of the interior had met
in secret with a representative of Peabody Coal, who advo-
cated in favor of dramatically reducing royalties owed to
the Navajo Nation. The secretary then ordered that lower-
level agency officials' approval of a higher royalty rate be
reconsidered, which led to the approval of a significantly
lower rate that benefited the coal company. The Federal
Circuit had affirmed a $600 million judgment against the
government for breach of trust, and the Supreme Court
reversed the ruling, finding no duty at all to the Navajo
Nation. In 2009, after the Federal Circuit once again held
in favor of the Navajo Nation on a different theory, the
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the ruling. United
States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 1547 (2009).
Treaty Rights
In the last several decades, tribal interests have often
failed before the Supreme Court in most common law
questions, but the tribes have been relatively successful
in preserving their treaty rights. Typically in treaty rights
cases, the United States is an interested party or at the very
least an amicus in favor the tribal signatory to the treaty
because the treaty in question usually is being challenged
by a state government. The main case in point during the
period studied is Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, and once again the OSG shared oral argument
time with the tribal advocate. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
Mille Lacs involved the interpretation of an 1837 treaty,
which specifically reserved hunting and fishing rights for
the Indians, and whether an executive order from 1850
and a second treaty from 1855 had abrogated those rights.
Because the 1855 treaty did not mention those rights, the
Court held that it did not specifically abrogate them. But
the 1850 executive order purported to abrogate those
rights. A narrow 5-4 majority held that the President could
not abrogate the 1837 treaty unilaterally. In a similar case,
Arizona v. California, the United States and the Quechan
Tribe joined to persuade the Court that the federal gov-
ernment could bring claims for increased water rights on
behalf of the tribe. The Court ruled for the tribe by a vote
of 6-3. 530 U.S. 292 (2000). Finally, while not technically
a treaty rights claim, in Idaho v. United States, the OSG
successfully argued that an 1873 executive order and an
1891 act of Congress preserved the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's
rights to submerged lands in Lake Coeur d'Alene. 533 U.S.
282 (2001).
These treaty rights claims all involved 19"' century arm's
length transactions between the United States and Indian
tribes that state governments challenged more than 100
years later. The OSG's success rate reflects the federal
government's interest, perhaps, in preserving these long-
standing agreements with Indian tribes.
Criminal Law
Unlike the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, when the Supreme
Court decided numerous criminal cases involving federal,
tribal, and state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country,
between 1998 and 2009, the Court reviewed only one
criminal case involving Indian law: United States v. Lara.
541 U.S. 193 (2004). It is likely that the case caught the
Court's attention because it involved an act of Congress
designed to overrule a Supreme Court common law deci-
sion from 1990: Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). The
statute, known as the Duro Fix, restored tribal criminal
jurisdiction over a class of persons known as "nonmember
Indians"-Indian persons -who are citizens of an Indian
tribe but not members of the tribe prosecuting them.
After a decade of operation, a circuit split developed over
whether Congress had authority to reverse the Supreme
Court's decision that Indian tribes cannot have criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers of the tribe.
The OSG prevailed in Lara but took advantage of the
slightly unusual procedural posture of the case-a position
that potentially would have been ruinous to tribal interests.
Billy Jo Lara, a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians, had been prosecuted in tribal court for
punching a Bureau of Indian Affairs police officer who had
been cross-deputized by the Spirit Lake Tribe (the equiva-
40 I The Federal Lawyer I March/April 201 1
HeinOnline  -- 58 Fed. Law. 40 2011
lent of punching two sovereigns in the face). Only later
did the U.S. attorney bring charges for assaulting a federal
officer. Lara successfully argued before the Eighth Circuit
that the Spirit Lake Tribe's prosecution was valid only as
a delegation of federal authority (which was surely not
the intent of Congress, but the only way the Eighth Circuit
could see to uphold the Duro Fix statute), rendering the
subsequent federal prosecution a violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The OSG argued before the Supreme Court that
Congress had full authority to overrule a federal common
law decision, but argued in the alternative that the Spirit
Lake Tribe's prosecution of Lara was invalid, preserv-
ing the federal prosecution either way. The strategy of
Lara's counsel, which was completely caught up in this
conundrum and by the fact that Lara had not appealed his
conviction by a tribal court to federal court, as he could
have done under the Indian Civil Rights Act, collapsed
during oral argument. But the OSG's primary position
won the votes of only Justices Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor,
and Ginsburg, as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
only three of those justices remain on the Court today.
The OSG's alternative position persuaded at least two
justices-Kennedy and Thomas-and Justices Souter and
Scalia dissented on grounds that the Duro Fix statute was
unconstitutional. The Lara decision, hailed as a strong 7-2
precedent in favor of tribal and federal interests, is a some-
what weaker precedent, with two sitting justices in favor,
three against, and four undecided (Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan).
However, in two petitions brought in the 2005 term,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in cases that were
direct appeals of tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians, perhaps granting deference to U.S. interest in leg-
islating for criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. Morris
v. Tanner, 549 U.S. 970 (2006) (No. 05-1285); Means v.
Navajo Nation, 549 U.S. 952 (2006) (No. 05-1614).
Conclusions?
The success the Office of the Solicitor General has
enjoyed in opposing tribal interests remains unabated, and
already this term the Supreme Court has granted two peti-
tions brought by the United States against Indian tribes:
United States v. Tobono O'Odbam Nation and United States
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 559 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 130 S.. Ct. 2097 (2011); In re United States,
•590 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct.
856 (2011). Interestingly, three times this term the Court
has asked the OSG for its views on petitions for certiorari
involving state governments opposing tribal interests. In
Hogan v. Kaltag Tribal Council, the Court agreed with the
OSG's recommendation and denied the state of Alaska's
petition for certiorari. 131 S. Ct. 66 (2011). And in Thun-
derhorse v. Pierce, the Court again agreed with the OSG
in denying an American Indian prisoner's petition against
Texas, despite the likelihood that the lower court applied
the incorrect legal standard in a case involving religious
freedom. 131 S. Ct. 896 (2011). Two other invitation briefs
are pending at this writing. See Schwarzeneggar v. Rincon
Band of Luisefio Mission Indians of the Rincon Reservation
(No. 10-330) and Osage Nation v. Irby (10-537).
There are no clear answers to why tribal interests have
fared so poorly before the U.S. Supreme Court since the
1980s. A decade ago, Dean David Getches wrote that con-
victed criminals have a better success rate on the merits
than do Indian tribes and other tribal interests." Even less
clear is why the Office of the Solicitor General has such a
difficult time in cases involving Indian country, especially
given that the federal government has a treaty- and statute-
based trust relationship with Indian tribes. What is certain
is that the OSG will continue to play an enormous role in
Indian affairs. TFL
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